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Menno Hulswit
Peirce’s Teleological Approach 
to Natural Classes1
Every classification has reference to a tendency toward an 
end. If this tendency is the tendency which has determined 
the class characters of the objects, it is a natural classification.
(NEM, IV, 65; 1902)2
Though Peirce’s theory of natural classes is often mentioned in 
contemporary philosophy of science and metaphysics (Ian Hacking 
for example gives Peirce a prominent place in the tradition of natural 
kinds3), it has not as yet been studied thoroughly. Accordingly, the 
presentation of Peirce’s theory is often only partially correct, and 
sometimes even misleading. Perhaps the main reason for the absence 
of a thorough study is that Peirce’s theory of natural classes is inti­
mately related to his theory of final causation4— a concept which in 
contemporary philosophy is avoided for being a mystifying idea which
4
neither agrees with the methods nor with the results of modern sci­
ence. In a previous paper5 an attempt was made to show that this is a 
biased view, due to a number of false presuppositions, which were 
clearly recognized by Peirce a century ago. In this paper it will be 
shown that Peirce’s theory of natural classes is intimately linked to his 
conception of final causation.
Peirce held the view that in each act of causation there is an effi­
cient and a final component: final causes are general types that tend 
to realize themselves by (ideologically) determining processes of ef­
ficient causation. They are not future events, but general, physical 
possibilities. The efficient aspect of causation is that each event or
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fact is caused by a previous event or fact (the efficient cause); the 
teleological aspect is that each event or fact is part of a chain of events 
with a definite tendency. The tendency is the final cause o f the process. 
This entails that each act o f causation is mediated by a final cause.
Indeed, Peirce held that the condition for causes and effects to 
be mediated by final causes is that they belong to a natural class. 
Thus, Peirce’s theory o f causation requires an elucidation of his con­
cept of natural class. Conversely, since Peirce defines natural classes in 
terms of final causation, his concept of natural class must be consid­
ered within the perspective of his theory of final causation.
There are now at least three reasons for considering Peirce’s theory 
of natural classes: first, it has (as far as can be determined) never be­
fore been studied within its proper context of teleological causation. 
Secondly, Peirce’s theory o f natural kinds is thought by many to be 
relevant to contemporary discussions. Thirdly, if a Peircean critique 
of most of the contemporary views of teleology has any merit, and if 
it is true that there is a close link between the concepts of causation 
and natural class, then this critique may have serious consequences 
*
for contemporary debates on natural classes. An additional reason for 
discussing Peirce’s theory of natural classes is that it provides a good 
ground for discussing his alleged pluralism, which is a hot topic in 
contemporary Peirce studies. Accordingly, the first objective of this pa­
per is to reconstruct Peirce^s theory of natural classes. The second objec­
tive is to examine Peirce^s view o f the relationship between natural classes 
and causation} and to see whether it  contains insights that might be 
relevant to contemporary debates on natural kinds and causation.
1. N A T U R A L  K IN D S A N D  CAUSATION  
I N  CO NTEM PO RARY PHILOSOPHY
That there is a close relationship between causation and natural 
kinds is not as strange as it may seem at first. In the contemporary 
philosophy o f science and metaphysics it is widely believed that the 
concepts of causation, explanation, natural law, and natural kind are 
interrelated. For example, in an influential paper on natural kinds, 
W.V. Quine (1969, 132) emphasizes that the concept of causation
entails the concept of natural kind: “To say that one event caused 
another is to say that the two events are of kinds between which there 
is invariable succession.’5 Twenty years later, D.M. Johnson (1990, 
63) defines a natural kind as “a spatiotemporally unrestricted or re- 
peatable category ineliminatively presupposed by at least one true 
and explanatory law of nature.”
In their glossary to their anthology “The Philosophy of Science,” 
the editors Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout give a very 
general definition o f  natural kind, which, it may be assumed, is sup­
posed to cover most current theories. A natural kind is:
A type of property, process, state, event, or object studied by 
science, mentioned in scientific laws, and assumed to be a 
causal feature o f the world. The primary instances o f natural 
kinds are objects of scientific taxonomy, such as electrons in 
physics, zinc in chemistry, and species in biology. Natural 
kinds are contrasted with phenomena that are assigned no 
such systematic, organizing role, such as an event’s occur­
ring after I drop this pen, or an object’s being located 34 
miles west o f  the Liberty Bell. (1991, 778-9; italics mine)
According to this view, natural kinds, as opposed to other phenom­
ena, play a systematic role in our explanations of the world; they are 
supposed to be something like the world’s causal joints. The same 
idea is defended by J. Levinson (1991, 65), according to whom the 
objects belonging to a natural kind “occupy the same causal role in 
nature.” As it is not at all obvious, however, what it involves to be ‘a 
causal feature o f the world’ or to ‘occupy the same causal role in 
nature,’ it would seem clearly that the concept of natural kind pre­
supposes an elucidation of the concept of causation.
Bigelow, et al. (1992, 373) stress that natural kinds are always 
associated with essential properties. “If something is of a natural kind, 
then there will be properties which this thing must have to be a thing
of that kind, and which it could not cease to have without ceasing to
i
be a thing of that kind.” The idea that things belong to natural kinds
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seems to involve a commitment to essentialism: what makes a thing a 
member o f a particular natural kind is that it possesses a certain es­
sential property (or a cluster o f essential properties), a property both 
necessary and sufficient for a thing to belong to that kind. The essen­
tial property is supposed to provide an objective feature which deter­
mines to what kind a thing belongs, independently of any context of 
inquiry. It is also supposed to play an important explanatory role in 
regard to other properties and relations.
The main examples o f natural classes used by philosophers are the 
chemical elements and biological species. Especially the chemical ele-
*
ments are often taken to be paradigm cases of natural kinds. Consider 
Saul Kripke’s famous example of gold;6 the fact that gold is defined by 
its atomic number, entails that a thing is made of gold precisely when it 
is composed of atoms that have atomic number 79. It is because “the 
essence o f a natural kind must be necessary  ^ explanatory, and purely 
qualitative” (Sober, 1995, 345; italics mine), that the atomic number 
79 is said to provide the essence of the natural kind of gold. Whereas it 
is an accident that some lump of gold has a specific shape, it is sup­
posed to be a necessary truth that golden things have atomic number 
79. Moreover* the atomic number explains many properties of golden 
things. Finally, specifying the essence of gold does not involve a refer­
ence to shape, place or time; the atomic number supplies this general
qualitative specification (Sober, 1995,345).
The case of biological species is more complicated, for it is by no 
means clear that biological species have essences. The favored view is 
that species are individuals, According to this view species are said to 
be populations which have organisms as parts rather than as members 
(Hull, 1978). Organisms belong to the same species, not by virtue of 
their similarity, but because of their genealogical relatedness. Despite 
their common descent, they do not thereby form a natural kind (So­
ber, 1995, 346).
Apart from a certain agreement regarding chemical elements, 
philosophers tend heartily to disagree when it comes to giving clear 
examples of natural kinds. Thus Van Brakel (1992,243-4) lists a num­
ber of different interpretations: while Putnam includes multiple scle-
rosis, gold, horses, and electricity, Kripke and Quine mention colors, 
Hacking suggests social kinds, and Churchland does not hesitate to 
include mass, length, duration, charge, color, energy and momen­
tum. According to Van Brakel, this disagreement is not only due to 
different opinions regarding the distinction between natural kinds 
and artificial kinds, but more fundamentally different views regard­
ing induction, prototypes, universals, scientific realism, meaning and 
reference.7 Van Brakel might also have added the problems of causa­
tion, explanation and natural law.
Apparendy there are a great many conflicting theories about natu­
ral kinds. To obtain some clarity in the problem, a number of fu n d a ­
mental questions must be answered. Some of the most important are: 
(a) What are natural kinds?, (b) What argument is there for believing 
in their existence ?, (c) What use has science for the notion of natural 
kind?, (d) What are the demarcation criteria by virtue of which one 
can decide to what natural kind an object belongs?> (e) Is there a uniquely 
correct grouping of objects into natural kinds, or are there countless le­
gitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying the objects of the world?, 
(f) What is the precise relationship between causation, natural laws, 
and natural kinds?
But before pursuing these questions, we will first survey some 
recent interpretations of Peirce’s theory of natural kinds with the 
object o f obtaining a first impression of Peirce’s view and of prob­
lems involved. The currant interpretations are rather meager and in 
many respects contradictory.
2. SOME CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATIONS
OF PEIRCEAN N ATU RAL KINDS
2.1 Susan Haack^s Interpretation
A contemporary philosopher who stresses the importance of a 
detailed study of Peirce’s concept of natural kind, is Susan Haack. 
According to Haack in her “Extreme Scholastic Realism: Its Relevance 
to Philosophy of Science Today” (1992), Peirce’s ‘extreme scholastic 
realism’ entails that there are real laws of nature and real kinds, which 
are not dependent upon our characterization of the world. Haack
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defends Peirce’s ‘scholastic realism’ as a necessary presupposition of 
the whole scientific enterprise, but she realizes that “a full and detailed 
defense of this claim would require a better understanding of what 
makes a class natural” (Haack, 1992,42). As Haack understands it, it is 
Peirce’s view that without real laws and real kinds, no genuine science 
is possible. Without them there can be no explanation, nor can there 
be prediction or induction (1992, 28; 1993a, 134).
According to Haack, Peirce’s realism entails that the particular facts 
and events we observe, are the expression of an underlying pattern of 
natural kinds and laws. While particular facts and events are concrete, the 
underlying pattern consists of so called generals. This pattern is real inas­
much as it is independent o f  how any individual inquirer thinks about it. 
As science — which is by its very nature co-operative — proceeds, this 
real pattern will eventually emerge: “Which generals are real is a matter 
which would only be finally settled in a hypothetical completed science” 
(1992, 29; also 1993b, 353). If science were to continue long enough, 
it would yield true classifications and true laws of nature, that is to say, 
classifications and laws “from which the local and idiosyncratic, the un­
real, had been eliminated” (1992, 32),
Haack offers a number o f different descriptions of Peircean natural 
kinds that might help us to obtain a preliminary understanding. Natu­
ral kinds are: (1) “clusters of similarities holding together in a lawful 
manner,” (2) generals “that would figure in the laws,” and (3) “the 
kinds o f  things in the world which really do behave in a lawlike way.”8 
As examples o f Peircean natural kinds Haack mentions horses, 
men and stones. Since there are no laws of nature that are specific 
to, stones, the suggestion is that Peirce has a very broad idea of 
law* Haack observes, almost casually, that genuine Peircean laws 
are basically habits (1992, 28). Thus, stones as well as fundamen­
tal particles are natural kinds because they are the kind of things 
in the world that behave in a habit-like manner. Moreover, the 
habitual aspect o f  natural kinds is illustrated by the fact that, for 
instance, stones that do not actually fall, are nevertheless capable 
o f falling. For laws (habits) sustain subjunctive conditionals; they 
tell “no t just what does happen when but what would happen
if ...” (Haack, 1992, 28). We expect that if someone would for 
instance drop the stone he has in his hand, it would fall to the ground.
4
2.2 Christopher Hookway’s Interpretation
Hookway’s interpretation differs sharply from Haack’s position. 
He interprets Peirce as holding that there are infinitely many, but 
equally legitimate ways of dividing the world into kinds:
It is as if cognitive activity inevitably reads into reality a sort 
of articulated gesture, a system of classifications, which en­
ables us to bring our experience under control, but which 
does not correspond to anything real. Indeed Peirce’s pic­
ture of reality is close to this. He sees it as a continuous spread 
of reaction and feeling; where we draw the boundaries in 
thinking of it as containing individual objects, or how we 
classify the continuous range of possibilities which underlie 
general laws and characters is up to us. Generality is real, but 
dividing things into classes reflects our interests and conven­
tional decisions. (Hookway, 1985, 251; italics mine)
According to this description, Peirce is presented as an “anti-realist” 
who rejects the possibility of giving an objectively correct system of 
classifications, which reflects the nature of natural classes (Hookway, 
1985, 250). While Haack defended the view that our personal con­
siderations do not interfere in the ultimate (Peircean) scientific classi­
fication and that there is but one legitimate way of dividing the world 
into (Peircean) kinds, Hookway insists that, according to Peirce, clas­
sifications are entirely subjective and that there are countless correct 
ways of classifying the objects of the world.
2.3 Sandra Rosenthals Interpretation
A third  interpretation is given by Sandra Rosenthal: dividing 
things into classes partly reflects our interests and conventional 
decisions, and partly the way things really are* Consequently, 
there are many, but not infinitely many, equally legitimate ways
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of dividing the world into natural classes:
Knowledge is abstractive and selective. A world, though con­
crete, is nonetheless selective in the sense that a world, as the 
concrete content denoted by a system of meanings, is a way 
in which the concreteness of reality can be delineated or 
“fixed.” A system, once chosen, limits the alternatives pos­
sible within it, but alternative systems may be possible. (1994,
7-8; italics mine)
While our abstractive and selective process of knowledge imposes 
“cuts” upon the world, the decision regarding where these “cuts” 
occur is at least partially ours:
As Peirce notes, “Truly natural classes may, and undoubtedly 
often do, merge into one another inextricably” (CP 1.209), 
and thus boundary lines must be imposed, although the classes 
are natural. The continuity is there; where the “cut” is im­
posed is, in part, our decision. (Rosenthal, 1994, 8)
Thus, whereas Rosenthal with Hookway grants that there is an arbi­
trary element in establishing boundary lines between natural classes, 
she agrees with Haack in insisting that there is an objective ground to 
our natural classifications. Yet Rosenthal fails to tell us what such arbi­
trariness or convention entails. Does the absence of clear boundary 
lines entail that natural classes are not clearly defined? Or does it only 
mean that there are no clear demarcation criteria by virtue of which it 
can always be decided to which natural class an object belongs.
The three foregoing interpretations raise a fundamental ques­
tion concerning the nature of Peirce’s genuine or assumed pluralism: 
what, according to Peirce, is the (epistemological and ontological) 
origin o f our dividing the world into classes? Perhaps the best way of 
introducing Peirce’s own views is to consider his critique of John 
Stuart Mill’s definition o f natural kind.
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3. PEIRCE VERSUS MILL
3.1 Mill*s theory of natural kinds
According to Mill, every thing in the world belongs to some natu­
ral class or real kind. Mill made a distinction between natural classes 
and non-natural or artificial classes (Mill did not use the latter term). 
The main difference is that the things that compose a natural class have 
innumerous properties in common, whereas the things that belong to 
an artificial class resemble one another in but a few respects.
More precisely: a “real kind” is defined as a class “which is distin­
guished from all other classes by an indeterminate multitude of prop­
erties not derivable from one another...” (Mill, 1874,99). The mem­
bers of a natural or real class share innumerable properties that are 
not derivable from its defining character “by some law of causation.” 
Plants and animals, and sulphur and phosphor are examples of real
kinds (Mill, 1874, 97).
In contrast, the members of an artificial class share only a few prop­
erties, which “follow, as consequences, under laws of nature, from a 
small number of primary [characters] which can be precisely deter­
mined, and which, as the phrase is, account for all the rest” (Mill, 1874, 
98-99). The class of white things is an example of an artificial class:
White things are not distinguished by any common proper­
ties, except whiteness: or if they are, it is only by such as are 
in some way connected with whiteness. But a hundred gen­
erations have not exhausted the common properties of ani­
mals or plants, of sulphur or phosphorus; nor do we suppose 
them to be exhaustible, but proceed to new observations 
and experiments, in the full confidence of discovering new 
properties which were by no means implied in those we pre­
viously knew. (Mill, 1874, 97)
Similarly, the class of flat-nosed animals is an artificial class, because 
in addition to their flat noses, flat-nosed animals do not have any 
common properties other than those which are common to all ani­
mals (1874, 99).
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Mill seems to have been the first philosopher to seriously con­
sider social kinds,9 such as those o f Christians, Englishmen, and Math­
ematicians. He thought them to be artificial kinds, however, because 
there is no innumerable set of properties “common and peculiar” to 
Christians or Englishmen or Mathematicians; the limited number of 
properties shared by the mem bers o f  the class are logically or causally 
determined by their definitions; “A Christian, for example, differs 
from other human beings; but he differs only in the attribute which 
the word expresses, namely belief in Christianity, and whatever else 
that implies, either as involved in the fact itself, or connected with it 
through some law o f cause and effect” (Mill, 1874, 98).
3.2 ’Natural Kinds and the Uniformity of Nature;
Peirce^s Earliest Discussion of Natural Kinds
The problem of natural kinds first appears in Peirce’s work in 
“The Fourth Lowell Lecture” (1866). The main objective of this 
lecture was a critical discussion o f  Mill’s treatment of induction. In 
the course of the lecture Peirce raised two issues that are directly 
relevant for our understanding o f  his mature theory of natural kinds. 
The first issue concerns the relationship between natural classes and 
the uniformity of nature; the second issue pertains to the problem of 
defining a natural class.
Mill’s justification o f  the use o f induction was based on his belief 
in the uniformity o f  nature. Peirce criticized this view by pointing 
out that it begs the question: the justification of the belief in the 
uniformity of nature is based on the use of induction (Wl> 414; 1866), 
Whereas Peirce agreed with Mill that “everything there is belongs to 
some real kind” ( W l ,  416), he questioned Mill’s idea that the uni­
formity of nature consists in the existence of natural classes. First he 
pointed out that, while uniform relations are one type of relations in 
nature, there are many more entirely irregular relations:
Take any pear. It is sweet and all pears are sweet. There is a 
uniformity. But it is mine; and all pears are not mine. It is 
next to a bunch o f grapes, and all pears are not next to a
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bunch of grapes. It is ripe and not all pears are ripe. [...] And 
so I might go on indefinitely. Indeed when it is remembered 
that everything in the world is related to every other in count­
less ways; it is plain that there is no end to the excess of 
accidental relations over those which present any regularity.
( VT1, 417).
Thus, the number of irregularities in individual objects and in natural 
classes greatly exceeds the number of regularities. Horses, for ex­
ample, have all kinds of characters in common, like swiftness, strength, 
and timidness; they all have backbones and long heads; they are all 
herbivorous, etc. But, not all animals with backbones are herbivo­
rous, and not all strong things are swift. “So that even in this respect 
nature is not very uniform” ( W 1, 418).
Secondly, the statement that there are exact uniformities is not 
warranted by experience:
Every student of physics knows that a law which is exactly 
conformed to in nature without interference from other laws, 
is almost if not quite unknown. Every law that is discovered 
therefore is found after a few years not to be exact. (W 1,420)
Moreover, since there are exceptions to almost any rule ( W 1, 419), 
it is highly improbable that there are uniformities in nature that are 
exact or without exception.10
Peirce concluded from these observations that the objects that 
belong to the same natural class, need not have all the characters that 
seem to belong to the class: “it must be admitted that there are excep­
tions to almost every rule. Thus many of the characters which seem 
to belong to a class universally only belong to a part of it” ( W  1, 
419). Peirce gave the example of a man with two heads. Though 
having just one head is a character that belongs to the class of Man 
universally, it is not impossible that one day a man would be born 
with two heads. Whereas he would be an exception to the general 
rule, he would still belong to the natural class of Man. Therefore, if
733 Menno Hulswit
we use Mill’s definition o f uniformity of nature — “the universe is so 
constituted, that whatever is true in one case, is true in all cases of a 
certain description” — then “natural classes cannot constitute a uni­
formity in nature” ( W 1, 420).
The second issue that is relevant to our understanding of the 
mature Peirce concerns his definition of natural class. According to 
Peirce, natural classes have at least one characteristic in common apart 
from their defining character. A  natural class ahas other properties than 
those which are implied in its definition” (italics mine), for to define 
something is just to state the meaning of a word. If we define Man as 
a rational animal, then the expression “Man is rational” is simply an 
analytic statement. But each class has other properties than those 
implied in its definition; what makes a class natural is that there is at 
least one other universal character over and above the characters that 
compose its definition:
Suppose this black board were dotted all over with chalk; and - 
let these dots represent the individuals in the world. Then let 
us draw a circle around those which have any common char­
acter. Let this circle for example include all the animals and 
this other all the rational beings. Then what they both include 
would be rational animals. And this will be represented as a 
natural class if it be entirely or nearly enclosed by another circle. 
That will be all that is required to make it a natural class for 
then it will have a universal character besides the rational and 
animal which compose its definition, (W 1, 419; 1866)
One year later> Peirce came to the following definition of natural class:
... a natural class is one which can be so defined that some­
thing can be predicated o f  it which cannot be predicated of 
the genera included in its definition. ( W 2 y 443; 1867)
The other character is, according to Peirce, precisely what makes the 
difference between a logical definition and a scientific one. Taxonomists
cannot do with just a logical definition; they need some reference 
to empirical facts. Thus, Peirce seemed to suggest that, though the 
elements o f  natural classes have a number of empirical properties in 
common ( W  1, 418), the taxonomist is free to choose those he 
considers to be relevant. Any empirical fact which belongs to all (or 
nearly all) the members of the class will do, not just the ones that 
are specific to the members of the class. Thus, if man be defined as 
a rational animal, ‘man’ is the natural class, ‘rationality’ is the defin­
ing character, and ca humanlike set of teeth5 could serve as the em­
pirical character.
To summarize: according to the early Peirce, (1) everything in the 
world belongs to some natural class or real kind; (2) natural classes do 
not constitute uniformities; (3) a natural class is characterized by (a) a 
defining character and the characters it implies, and (b) an empirical 
character which belongs to all or nearly all the members o f the class.
3.3 Peirce’s Baldwin Definition of Kind
Having obtained some insight into Peirce’s earliest view of natural 
kinds, we will now consider some of Peirce’s later texts, especially his 
Baldwin definition o f “Kind” (1901). In this latter text, Peirce gave, in 
just a few words, a devastating critique of Mill’s theory of natural kinds: 
first, it is simply not true that artificial kinds like white things have only 
a few properties in common. When Mill talked of “properties,” he 
must have had in mind, mainly, characters that are interesting to us. 
For it is obvious that all white things have innumerable common prop­
erties. Secondly, Peirce rejected Mill’s idea that a class of elements whose 
common properties are caused by a few primary properties cannot be a 
natural kind. Indeed, it is precisely the goal of the man of science to 
explain the multitude of properties of a kind in terms of a small amount 
of underlying properties (CP 6.384,1901),
In other manuscripts,11 Peirce offered one simple example to dis­
prove Mill’s definition: the class cow is a natural class, while red cow is 
not. The class of red cows has all the features of the class of cows, and 
moreover, the feature o f redness. I f  Mill would have admitted that 
the class o f cows is a natural class, he also must have admitted that the
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class o f red cows is. For if  it is true that cows belong to a natural class 
because they have a large or even apparently inexhaustible number of 
properties in common (which are not in any way dependent on its 
defining character), then the same must hold for red cows, because 
they even share one more common characteristic. Yet such a class is
not a “real kind” .(MS 421; 1893-5). Evidently Peirce presupposed 
that Mill would have accepted the common sense opinion that red 
cows do not form a natural class.
After thus having criticized Mill, Peirce gave the following defi­
nition o f natural class (or real kind):12
Any class which, in addition to its defining character, has 
another that is o f  permanent interest and is common and 
peculiar to its members, is destined to be conserved in that 
ultimate conception o f the universe at which we aim, and is 
accordingly to be called ‘real.’ (CP6.384; 1901)
Compared to his definition of 1867, Peirce makes explicit the idea 
that a natural class must have, over and above its defining character, 
another character which must not only be of permanent interest and 
common, but also peculiar to its members.
3.4 The PRE“character
Consider the case o f cman.J I f ‘man’ is a natural class, the ele­
ments o f  that class must share a defining character, for example ratio­
nality. But human beings also share other properties. For instance, 
they all have a ‘humanlike set o f teeth.’ But clearly this property is 
not directly related to their humanity. The character needed must 
somehow be relevant to what makes us distinctly human. Such char* 
acter might for instance be the character of ‘having a brain with a 
certain complex cortical structure.’ Such character meets the require­
ments spelled out by Peirce in his preceding quote: it is not the defin­
ing character, it is of permanent interest, and it is common and pecu- 
i
liar to the members of the class. Because this character is genuinely 
empirical in nature, I shall henceforth refer to the defining character
as the D-character, and to the other character as the PRE-character 
{permanently relevant empirical character). The main difference is 
that while the D-character is a general principle (or ‘Third’), the PRE- 
character is an essential quality (or ‘First’) embodied in an existing 
thing (or "Second’). The most salient feature of a PRE-character is 
the requirement that it be permanently relevant, and thus perma­
nently important
In 1867 Peirce had given a definition of ‘an important charac­
ter' which he still held to be correct in 1902.13 According to his 
explanation in his 1902 paper “On Classification,” a taxonomer con­
siders a character to be important because it involves certain others, 
be it only “a particular likelihood to taking certain forms.” Hence, 
“importance consists in a character’s universally carrying with it cer­
tain others, be those others no more than tendencies” (NEMIV^ 65; 
1902). In the text of 1902, however, Peirce claimed that this 1867- 
definition needed a fundamental correction: “an important character 
must not only entrain others, but it must entrain another which has 
relation to the purpose in view” (NEM IV, 65). This entails that the 
PRE-character universally carries with it certain other characters, though 
these may be only tendencies. Moreover; among those other characters 
there is a t least one that is closely related to the D-character; which, as 
will be shown in section five, is precisely what Peirce meant by “the 
purpose in view,”
Thus, human beings, defined as rational animals, do form a natural 
class. The PRE-character of ‘having a brain with a certain complex 
structure’ “entrains,” among other things, the tendency to form com­
plex thoughts, which is a necessary condition for being rational. Thus, 
‘having a brain with a certain complex structure’ is a good example of 
a close relationship between the PRE-character and the D-character.
Peirce’s considerations about ‘importance’ allow us to modify 
his Baldwin definition as follows: a natural class is any class that is 
characterized by a D-character and a PRE-character. The PRE-char­
acter universally carries with it certain tendencies, of which there is a t 
least one that is closely related to the D-character,
Given this definition, a number of problems arise. O f these, the
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first one to be examined concerns the distinction between ‘kinds’ 
and ‘classes,’ which Peirce made near the end of his career (1908).
4. K IN D S A N D  CLASSES
A kind is an entity that corresponds to a set, the elements of 
which do not exist; a class is an entity corresponding to a set of which 
at least one element does exist. Thus, Peirce pointed out for instance 
that, while in his time, black tulips were non-existent, nevertheless 
some people (for instance, gardeners) may very well have thought of 
the possibility o f growing black tulips. While the kind ‘black tulip’ 
was real, there was no natural class of existing black tulips. For the 
‘existence’ o f  a natural class requires the existence of at least one 
specimen of that kind:
For the class is that ens mtionis whose existence consists in 
the actualization of a definite kind. The actualization in an 
existing singular is one requisite to a class, being requisite to 
its existence: the character which it is required that every
»
member of the class should have, is a second requisite to the 
class, being requisite to its entity. The two together make up 
its ousia, its rational essence. (MS 200/00172; 1908)14
This is an interesting definition for a number of reasons. The first 
thing that draws attention is that a class is called an ens mtionis or 
“being of reason,” Peirce applied this term, borrowed from Duns 
. Scotus (and other scholastics), to entities that owe their reality to an 
operation o f the intellect which Peirce called ‘hypostatic abstraction.’ 
Contrary to a real being or ens in re extra m inutm , such as a con­
crete, individual horse, an ens mtionis is a ‘thing’ that depends for its 
existence upon reason or thought. Whereas real beings exist inde- 
pendendy o f  thought, beings of reason depend on thought. But there 
are two kinds of entia mtionis: those with a foundation in reality and 
those without foundation. Examples of the former are genera and 
species (for instance, animal and horse); examples of the latter are 
mythical figures.
Thus, according to Duns Scotus, some universals exist only 
by virtue o f the operation of the intellect, but cannot in any sense 
be said to be mere ‘figments’ of the mind. We can form universal 
concepts only because there is an objective correlate o f them in 
the objects themselves; the “common nature.” Horseness, for ex­
ample, is the common nature o f all the things called horses. But 
horseness is neither a universal nor a particular. Horseness is simply 
horseness. Universals are concepts formed by the mind, but there 
is an objective basis to them in the “common nature” o f the con­
crete, existing things.
Peirce had borrowed Duns Scotus’s view to the extent that some­
times our abstractions reflect objectively real general principles: “that 
wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to 
create entia mtionis that are, nevertheless, sometimes real...” (CP 
4.549; 1906). He also had borrowed Duns Scotus’s idea that real 
generals have the reality of possibility, not of actuality, albeit with a 
different twist.15 Peircean real generals are not common natures or 
forms, but final causes or laws.
That generals are possibles entails that, though they may be real, 
they do not exist. It may be noted that Peirce was somewhat careless 
when he spoke of the existence of natural classes, for classes cannot 
strictly be said to exist. The members of a class exist, but the class itself 
does not. Classes are entia rationisy which are generals, and generals 
are real but do not exist; they are possibilities. Only individual things 
exist, that is, only things which occupy a definite space during a cer­
tain time. Individuals can be pointed at; generals cannot.
We now know that a class must meet at least two criteria: it must 
have a t least one existing member; and each member o f the class must 
have both a defining or D-character and an indefinite number of D- 
r elated class characters,16 A  kind differs from a class on two counts: it 
does not contain an existing member\ and therefore it has only a D- 
character which constitutes its essence.
Peirce makes a distinction between the epistemological essence 
and the metaphysical essence of a kind:
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The essence of anything is that thought which renders the 
thing possible. The epistemological essence is that thought 
which renders it possible to conceive of the things. The meta­
physical essence is that intellectual structure which renders the
being of the thing possible. (MS 200/00145; 1908)17
i
In natural classifications, the epistemological essence coincides with 
the metaphysical essence. According to Peirce, it is usually quite easy 
to determine the metaphysical essence of an artefact. The metaphysi­
cal essence of a lamp, for example, is that it can give light. And that is 
the purpose which brings lamps about. And the metaphysical essence 
of a stove is “that it is intended to diffuse warmth” (CP 6.336; circa 
1909). But the question regarding the metaphysical essence of a natural 
object is much tougher.
One might wonder whether the distinction between metaphysi­
cal essence and epistemological essence makes any sense from a prag­
matic perspective. Does it not presuppose a bifurcation between the 
realm of knowledge and the realm of being? And doesn’t the idea o f  
‘metaphysical essence3 presuppose what Putnam has called “a God’s 
eye point of view”? We have to admit that Peirce’s terminology is 
confusing, for it suggests that there is an objective reality indepen­
dent o f  our knowing processes. But this is not what Peirce had in 
mind. There is no metaphysical essence independent of our knowing 
processes; the metaphysical essence is independent of how you and I 
or anyone else at a specific moment characterizes the world. In the 
long run, however, the classifications of the scientific society will re­
flect the metaphysical essence o f things. Much of the confusion arises 
from the fact that, though Peirce tries to break with traditional ways 
of Conceiving the question of universals, essences, or kinds, he does 
not break with traditional language.
Another possible objection is related to the fact that the essence o f 
anything is by nature immutable. But, contrary to Platonic or Aristote­
lian essences, and to Scotistic “common natures,” which are all immu­
table, static forms, Peircean essences are of the nature of habit; and 
habits are, at least in principle, subject to evolution. Consequently, one
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of the most persistent objections against natural classes, namely that they 
presuppose an immutable essence, does not hold for Peirce’s position.
Yet another difficulty regards the intellectual structure o f essences. 
Peirce, however, did not restrict ‘idea’ or 'thought’ to something 
that a person has in mind, or to a psychical act of thinking: “by an 
idea [...] I mean a principle such as may be set before the mind in 
thought” {MS 1344,11; 1902). Thus, the statistical distribution of a 
large number of things, say the molecules of a gas, expresses a statis­
tical law which is the ‘idea’ of the distribution (MS 1344, 11; NEM  
IV, 65-66). Moreover, ideas are not only (a) general principles; they 
are also (b) in a sense purposive or quasi-purposive (end directed). 
Thus, the statistical law is a general idea, which is the final cause 
explaining the tendency toward the end state of the gas. Ideas, there­
fore, have a certain inherent tendency to realize themselves. An idea 
without efficacy cannot be an idea at all:
Imagine such an idea if you can! If it was communicated to 
you viva voce from another person, it must have had effi­
ciency enough to get the particles of air vibrating. If you 
read it in a newspaper, it has set a monstrous printing press 
in motion. I f  you thought it out yourself, it had caused some­
thing to happen in your brain. And again, how do you know 
that you did have the idea when this discussion began a few 
lines above, unless it had efficiency to make some record on
the brain? (CP  1.231; 1902)
We have seen so far that the essence of a natural class is of the nature of 
an idea, and that ideas are, basically, fina l causes. The defining idea of 
a set of objects is its epistemological essence. In natural classes, how* 
ever, the defining idea or epistemological essence reflects the meta­
physical essence. Because the defining idea of a natural class is a final 
cause, it seems appropriate to further explore the purposive nature of 
ideas or essences.
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5. CLASSIFICATION AC C O RD IN G  TO FINAL CAUSES
In his note “On Classification” o f his Carnegie Application 
(1902),18 Peirce mentioned that he had been a student of Agassiz (in 
1861), and that his study over the years had convinced him that 
Agassiz5 system of classification was basically correct. Peirce formu­
lated Agassiz’s central insight as follows: “every classification whatso­
ever, be it  merely arranging words in alphabetical order\ has reference to 
some purpose, or some tendency to an end* (NEM, IV, 65; 1902; italics 
mine). Thus, classifications are teleological instruments, or a way of 
handling things for some particular purpose. Now, arranging words 
in alphabetical order is an example in which it is just our purpose that 
determines the classification. That is why the classification is artificial. 
In natural classifications, however, it is not our purpose but the pur­
pose or quasi-purpose o f  the class itself that is at stake:
Every unitary classification has a leading idea or purpose, 
and is a natural classification in so far as that same purpose is 
determinative in the production of the objects classified.
(NEM,TV, 15; 1902)
Similarly,
Every classification has reference to a tendency toward an 
end. If this tendency is the tendency which has determined 
the class characters of the objects, it is a natural classification.
(NEM, IV, 65; 1902)
Thus, the defining idea of a natural class ideologically determines 
the class characters of the objects belonging to the class. To clearly 
distinguish them from the PRE-character (permanently relevant em­
pirical character), we will call the class characters from now on TDE- 
characters (ideologically determined empirical characters). Though 
Peirce sometimes used the term “essential characters” (for example 
in CP 1.204), for reasons yet to be explained, his term “class charac­
ters” is more appropriate.
In order to precisely understand the relationship between defining 
character and TDE-characters, we must consider what is perhaps Peirce’s 
most important text on natural classes, “A Detailed Classification of 
the Sciences” (CP 1,203-283; 1902), where he worked out his view 
that ideas may be said to be teleologically causal. Properly speaking, 
the text deals with the problem of finding a classification scheme in 
which all the sciences find their hierarchical place. But since his anti- 
nominalistic stance implied that such a scheme is based on natural or 
real classes, Peirce thought it necessary first to explain what he meant 
by a natural class. In his attempt to give an exact description of a natu­
ral class, he concluded that the final cause is its defining characteristic. 
Accordingly, a natural or real class is defined as a class “of which all the 
members owe their existence to a common final cause” (CP 1.204), or as 
cca class the existence of whose members is due to a common and peculiar 
fina l cause” (CP 1.211). The final cause is described in this context as 
“a common cause by virtue of which those things that have the essen­
tial characters of the class are enabled to exist” (CP 1.204). Thus, the 
defining idea must clearly be understood as causally active in the ideo­
logical sense. For instance when Peirce wrote:
[e]very class has its definition, which is an idea; but it is hot 
every class where the existence, that is, the occurrence in the 
universe of its members is due to the active causality of the 
defining idea of the class. That circumstance makes the epithet 
natural particularly appropriate to the class... (CP 1.214; 1902),
the expression ‘active causality’ must be taken in this teleological sense. 
In view o f this, we must again return to the general characteristics of 
Peirce’s conception o f  final causation.
According to Peirce, final causes are general types that tend to 
realize themselves by determining processes of mechanical causation. 
They are not future events, but general (physical) possibilities. The 
symptoms of final causation are that the end state o f  a process can be 
reached in different ways, and that the process is irreversible. Final 
causes are basically habits: they (‘habitually’) direct processes toward
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an end state. Like human habits, habits of nature (laws of nature) are 
final causes because they display tendencies toward an end state. Final 
causes stand to laws of nature as genus to species. Moreover, habits are 
not static entities, for they may evolve in the course of time. Peirce 
called the possible evolution of final causes “developmental teleology.”19 
In view of this, what does it mean to say that a natural class owes 
its existence to a common defining idea or final cause?
*
Do I mean that the idea calls new matter into existence? 
Certainly not. That would be pure intellectualism, which 
denies that blind force is an element of experience distinct 
from rationality, or logical force. [...] What I mean by the 
idea’s conferring existence upon the individual members of 
the class is that it confers upon them the power of working 
out results in this world, that it confers upon them, that is to 
say, organic existence, or, in a word, life. (CP 1.220; 1902)
Ideas cannot call new matter into existence; they can only work if 
there is matter to work upon. The action of ideas is typical of final 
causation; the action o f  matter is typical of efficient causation. Blind 
force (efficient causation) and rationality (final causation) are two 
undeniable elements of our experience; one requires the other. But 
all this does not as yet explain that “the idea [confers] existence upon 
the individual members o f the class,” and that it gives them “organic 
existence” or “life.” The reason must be that, if matter were not 
governed by ideas or final causes, there would not be any regularity 
in its behavior, which means that it would not even exist:
... if [matter] were to be deprived of the governance of ideas, 
and thus were to have no regularity in its action, [...] through­
out no fraction of a second could it steadily act in any gen­
eral way. For matter would thus not only not actually exist, 
but it would not even have potential existence, since poten­
tiality is an affair of ideas. It would be just downright noth­
ing. (CP 1.218; 1902)
Two examples may illustrate Peirce’s intention. The first is taken from 
die realm of social phenomena: the natural class of socialists. A mem­
ber of the community of socialists can only be a socialist by virtue of 
the idea o f socialism. In Peirce’s view, it is the idea of socialism that 
creates the socialist, not the other way round. Ideas are not just cre­
ations of a particular mind, but on the contrary, they have a capacity, a 
power, to create or to find their vehicles: “it is the idea which will 
create its defenders, and render them powerful” (CP 1.217). O f course, 
the idea of socialism does not create the person who is the socialist. But, 
given an existent person, the idea of socialism may turn him into a 
socialist. The idea of socialism confers existence upon the individual 
members of the natural class of socialists. It gives them “organic exis­
tence” or “life” as socialists*, that is to say, it makes them behave, at least 
to a certain extent, as socialists are supposed to behave. To exist as a 
socialist requires a certain amount of regularity in one’s behavior; it 
requires that one’s behavior be directed by the idea of socialism.
The second example is related to what might be called Peirce’s 
(metaphysical) holism. Final causation is seen as that general principle 
in virtue of which a whole is more than the sum of its parts. The final 
cause is the intellectual structure or thought that ties the parts together, 
and gives them “organic existence” or “life.” In Peirce’s words:
Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts
compose the whole; final causation is that kind of causation
whereby the whole calls out its parts. (CP  1.220; 1902)
Thus, it is the final cause which confers “organic existence” or “life” 
upon the individual members of a natural class. To illustrate this idea, 
Peirce gave the example of a dissected corpse. No one would con­
sider a man’s organs lying separately on a stretcher as a human being. 
The dissection might give some insight into what parts are required 
to make the human body work, that is, it would at most display effi­
cient causation. But it cannot explain why a human body works: “The 
final causation, which is what characterizes the definitum , it leaves 
out of account” (CP 1.220). The final cause is that principle whereby
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a person is something more than just a body; it gives the body "or­
ganic existence” or “life.”
Peirce had a simple and convincing answer to anyone who would 
object, and who would insist that it is only matter that is essential for 
the existence of an individual person: whereas the matter we are made 
o f continually changes, our form remains the same. The existence of 
an individual man is something altogether different from the matter 
he happens to be composed of, and “which is incessantly passing in 
and o u t.”20 That which gives continuity to his existence is not the 
matter but the form, that is, his defining idea. This defining idea or 
final cause is what traditionally has been called the soul of man.
There is every indication that Peirce’s conception of the defining 
idea slowly evolved as he gradually became more committed to a scho­
lastic realism,21 Whereas in 1866 the defining idea had a predomi­
nantly epistemological status, from 1902 onwards its status was first 
and foremost ontological While in 1866 Peirce had defined a natural 
class as a “class that has other properties than those which are implied 
in its definition and these other characters would make it a natural
class” ( W  1, 418; 1866), in 1902, the defining idea is no longer a 
character which logically implies certain other characters. Instead, it is a 
final cause to which the members of the class owe their existence: the 
existence of the objects o f  the class “is due to the active causality of the 
defining idea o f the class” (CP 1.214; italics mine). Whereas in 1866 
the defining idea had supplied the epistemological essence of the class, 
that is to say, “that thought which renders it possible to conceive of 
things,” in 1902 it displayed the metaphysical essence or “that intellec­
tual structure which renders the being of the thing possible.”
Whereas until 1901 (in his Baldwin definition) Peirce had em­
phasized the permanently relevant empirical character (PRE-charac­
ter), from 1902 onwards he had replaced it by an indefinite number 
o f teleologically determined empirical characters (TDE-characters), 
which were subservient to the defining idea or D-character. The main 
difference between PRE-characters and TDE-characters is that, con­
trary to PRE-characters which are essential qualities but not teleo - 
logically determined by the D-character, the TDE-characters are ‘non-
iessential’ qualities (in a sense yet to be explained) which are id e o ­
logically determined by the D-character.
The question whether knowledge of the common final cause is suf­
ficient to determine the class (or classes) to which an object belongs, or 
whether we need other demarcation criteria, requires examination.
6. CRITERIA OF D EM ARCATIO N
Because natural classes must be understood in terms of final causes, 
it is necessary first to consider some further characteristics of final 
causes before the question of demarcation criteria can be addressed.
Final causes are general. This generality involves both vagueness 
and longitude. Final causes are general because: (1) they are not spatio- 
temporal; (2) they determine only some but not all qualities of a class 
o f  objects (or of a process). For example, the idea of building a house 
only determines that the end product will be a house, but not the 
specific form of the house. This lack of specificity is also called the 
vagueness of the final cause. Finally (3), final causes are general be­
cause they are not exhausted by any finite number of instantiations.
Moreover, final causes have a certain longitude. “By this I mean 
that while a certain ideal end state of things might most perfectly 
satisfy a desire, yet a situation somewhat different from that will be 
far better than nothing; and in general, when a state is not too far 
from the ideal state, the nearer it approaches that state the better” 
(CP 1.207; 1902). If, for some reason, we do not succeed in realiz­
ing our plan to write a book on natural kinds, the second best thing 
would be to write some articles on the subject. Though there was a 
definite tendency toward an end state — a book on natural kinds —, 
external or internal elements kept our purpose from being fully real­
ized. But a partial realization is much better than no realization at all.
A third element, next to their longitude and vagueness, is impor­
tant to the determining cause of a natural class: although a final cause 
is in itself rather general and simple, it necessarily tends to a greater 
definiteness and complexity in the course of its realization (MS 1343, 
p .15; 1902). Such process usually involves conditions that are spe­
cific to every step, as well as ‘decisions’ regarding the further realiza-
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tion of the general purpose. In the course of building a house, all 
kinds of decisions must be made about shape, size, material, etc., and 
each of these functions as a subsidiary purpose.
As a result o f (a) the vagueness and (b) the longitude of final 
causes, and as a result o f (c) the action of subsidiary final causes, the 
class characters o f the objects of a natural class (that is, the qualities 
determined by its fin a l cause) cluster around certain average values. 
Peirce illustrates this by an example borrowed from human experi­
ence: if we are to produce artificial light as economically as we can, 
we must consider all kinds of additional subsidiary purposes:
... the situation o f things most satisfactory to one desire is 
almost never the situation most satisfactory to another. A 
brighter lamp than that I use would perhaps be more agree­
able to my eyes; but it would be less so to my pocket, to my 
lungs, and to my sense of heat. Accordingly, a compromise is 
struck; and since all desires are somewhat vague, the result is 
that the objects actually will cluster about certain middling 
qualities, some being removed this way, some that way, and 
at greater and greater removes fewer and fewer objects will 
be so determined. Thus, clustering distributions will charac­
terize purposive classes. (CP 1.207; 1902; italics mine)
This consideration is relevant to the issue of demarcation criteria. 
Peirce illustrated this with an example taken from archeology:
... Prof. Petrie found in the town o f Naucratis some hundred 
and eighty standard weights. The calculus of probabilities ap­
plied to their weight-values proves that they were intended to 
conform to five different quasi-prototypes; but many of the 
weights, owing to the imperfection of their manufacture, have 
intermediate values, so that, as far as their governing intended 
character goes, it would be impossible to say to which stan­
dard any one such intermediate weight was intended to con­
form. (MS 1343, p .14; also 1.209-10; both 1902)
This example reveals that closely related classes are not, in general\ 
separated by sharp lines o f demarcation. Some forms may just as well 
belong to one natural class as to another. In such cases, further in­
vestigation will usually show that there are other, more or less acci­
dental characters, which may help in directing the forms to their true 
classes. Such characters, which are not specific to the class, may help 
us in ascertaining whether a given individual belongs to one class 
rather than the other: “unless we have some supplementary informa­
tion we cannot tell which ones had one purpose and which the other”
( CP 1.208). In the case o f Petrie’s example, further information might 
concern the shapes or the material of the stones, or some other “ines­
sential” character (MS 1343, p. 13-14).
The example of the weights also reveals that, though natural 
classes are characterized by a defining idea which makes up their 
metaphysical essence, there are no essential qualities that are both nec­
essary and sufficient for belonging to a specific natural class:
[We may want to] enumerate characters which are absolutely 
decisive as to whether a given individual does or does not 
belong to the class. But it may be, as our [example o f the 
weights] shows, that this is altogether out of question; and 
the fact that two classes merge is no proof that they are not 
truly distinct classes. (CP 1.224; 1902)
Though there are no essential qualities by virtue of which it can unam­
biguously be ascertained to which natural class the weights with inter­
mediate values belong, they nevertheless were intended to conform to 
one definite prototype. Each of these weights therefore belongs to 
one specific natural class. Apparently, in 1902 Peirce had distanced 
himself from his Baldwin definition (1901), according to which each 
member of a natural class was characterized by at least one essential 
quality: its permanently relevant empirical or PRE-character. Thus, things 
belong to the same natural class, not because of some essential qualities 
(which are Firsts according Peirce’s categorial system), but because o f a 
metaphysical essence which to an idea or final cause (which is a Third).
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Moreover: in the last quote, Peirce seems to reintroduce his 
1866-idea that the objects that belong to the same natural class, need 
not have all the qualities that seem to belong to the class; “it must be 
admitted that there are exceptions to almost every rule. Thus many 
of the characters which seem to belong to a class universally only 
belong to a part o f it” ( W  1, 419; see section 3.1). Class qualities 
therefore are not essential qualities.
7. RECAPITU LATIO N: DEFINITION  
OF P E IR C E A N  N A T U R A L  CLASSES
Because the developments in Peirce’s conception of natural classes 
are relatively complex, it may be good to summarize the results ob­
tained so far. This summary will be followed by an attempt to formu­
late a definition of Peircean natural kinds that displays Peirce’s ma­
ture position as fully as possible.
In 1866, Peircean natural classes were characterized by (a) a de­
fining character, (b) characters that are logically implied by its defini­
tion, and (c) an empirical character (section 3.1).
According to Peirce’s Baldwin definition of “Kind” (1901), natu­
ral classes were characterized by a defining character (D-character) in 
combination with one empirical character (PRE-character). Both char­
acters were thought to be “of permanent interest” and were consid­
ered to be “common and peculiar” to the members of the class (3.2).
We proposed a reformulation of Peirce’s Baldwin definition of 
“Kind,” based on Peirce’s note “On Classification” of his Carnegie Ap­
plication (1902). According to this reconstruction, a Peircean natural 
class is any class that is characterized by a D-character and a PRE-charac­
ter, both of which are common and peculiar to the members of the class. 
The PRE-character universally carries with it certain tendencies of which 
there is at least one that is closely related to the D-character (3.3).
In 1908 Peirce made a distinction between natural classes and 
kinds. Whereas a kind is an entity corresponding to a set the elements 
of which do not exist, a class is an entity corresponding to a set of 
which at least one element exists. A class must meet at least two crite­
ria: it must have at least one existing member, and each member of
the class must have both a D-character and at least one ideologically 
determined empirical character (TDE-character). A kind differs from 
a class on two counts: it does not contain an existing member, and 
therefore it has only a D-character which constitutes its essence (4).
Peirce adopted Duns Scotus’s view of classes as entia rationis3 
owing their reality to an operation of the intellect. Natural classes 
are abstractions corresponding to objectively real general principles, 
They are, however, not pure abstractions (or ‘Firsts’), but generals 
( ‘Thirds’) embodied in concrete extisting things (‘Seconds’). Because 
these real generals are possibilities, not actualities, natural classes can­
no t strictly be said to exist, but are nevertheless real (4).
In 1902 Peirce related natural classes to their final causes. Ac­
cordingly, he defined a natural class as “a class the existence of whose 
members is due to a common and peculiar final cause” (CP 1.204), 
by virtue o f which the members of the class behave in a regular way 
which is characteristic for that particular class (5).
Peirce’s relating natural classes to final causation marked an im ­
portant shift in the evolution of his conception of natural classes. Whereas 
in its .original definition (1866), the function of the defining idea of a 
natural class was predominantly epistemological, in his later works he 
defined natural classes in terms of final causation, and thus the defin­
ing character came to display the metaphysical essence o f  the class 
(5). Thus, whereas for the early Peirce (1866), the relationship be­
tween defining idea and essential qualities was a logical one,22 to the 
later Peirce (1902), the determination of the class or TDE-characters 
by the defining idea was (ideologically) causal.
This shift toward a causal relationship between the defining idea 
and its class characters had the advantage that Peirce no longer needed 
to refer to ‘important empirical characters’ (PRE-characters), since 
every class or TDE-character is closely related to the defining idea 
because it is teleologically caused by it. Moreover, TDE-characters 
are not essential qualities because they need to be neither common 
nor specific to the members of the class.
As a result of (a) the vagueness and (b) the longitude of final 
causes, and (c) the action of subsidiary final causes, the class qualities of
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the objects of a natural class (the qualities determined by its final cause) 
cluster around certain average values. Accordingly, closely related classes 
are not, in general, separated by sharp lines of demarcation (6).
The example o f the weights revealed that things do not belong 
to the same natural class because of some common essential qualities 
(Firstness), but on account o f a similarity in behavior; they conform 
to the same final cause or law. The locus of universality is final causa­
tion, habit, or law (Thirdness) (6).
On the basis of this reconstruction I propose to give the follow­
ing characterization o f Peircean natural classes: Things belong to the 
same natural kind> not because of certain essential qualities (Firsts)> 
but on account of a metaphysical essence which is a fina l cause (or Third). 
Thus} Peircean natural classes are characterized by (a) a defining char­
acter, which is a fin a l cause and (b) a number of class characters or 
teleo logically determined empirical characters (TDE-characters); more­
over, (c) the TDE-characters of the objects of a natural class cluster around 
certain average values; (d) the TDE-characters are not essential char­
acters because they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for  
making something to be a member of the class; (e) there are no clear 
boundary lines between closely related natural classes; (f) natural classes, 
though very real, are not existing entities; their reality is of the nature of 
possibilitynot o f actuality.
8. W H TBELIEVE IN  N ATU RAL CLASSES?
It is a well known fact that Peirce was greatly interested in medi­
eval logic, especially in the works of the nominalist William of Ockham 
and the realist Duns Scotus. He thought that nominalism was the 
greatest source of the mistakes of modern philosophy (CP 6.348, c. 
1909; CP 5.61, 1903). On the other hand, he thought the philoso­
phy o f Duns Scotus offered a good basis for a philosophy “which is 
best to harmonize with physical science” (CP 1.6, c. 1897). Whereas 
Ockham held that only individuals exist in the real world and that 
universals are mere names, Scotus insisted that the real world con­
tains real universals or generals.
Peirce thought the question regarding the reality of universals
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not only o f  great technical philosophical value, but also of great im­
portance for our daily moral concerns:
... the question of realism and nominalism [...] [has] branches 
[which] reach about our daily life. The question whether the 
genus homo has any existence except as individuals, is the ques­
tion whether there is anything of any more dignity, worth, 
and importance than individual happiness, individual aspira­
tions, and individual life. Whether men really have anything in 
common, so that the community is to be considered as an end 
in itself [....] is the most fundamental practical question in 
regard to every public institution ... (jEPI, 105, 1871).
Moreover, he thought the nominalistic outlook of most modern phi­
losophers was disastrous for the understanding of science. Nominal­
istic theories cannot explain that stientific theories are excellent tools 
for predicting future events. If  we say, with Ockham, that all gener­
alizations are subjective because they are based on the mind’s capac­
ity to form generalizations on the basis of perceived similarities, then 
our predictions miss any rational ground.
Peirce claimed to have proven the falsity of nominalism by a simple, 
by now famous, thought experiment (CP 5.93-101; 1903). In a Harvard 
class room he held up a stone, and asked his audience whether they could 
predict that it would fall if he were to drop it. Of course, everyone said he 
could. Peirce argued that this entails that there are real laws of nature. For 
if laws were merely generalizations of past happenings, there would be no 
ground for our expectation that the stone would fall to die ground. Hence, 
he drew the “irrefragable” conclusion that “general principles are really 
operative in nature” (CP 5.101). Without general principles, which are 
final causes (laws), prediction, induction and explanation would be im­
possible (CP 5.100-101; also Haack, 1992, 25-29). This view has the 
immediate implication that science must discover the true laws of nature, 
and therefore it must establish the kinds of things that are connected by 
those laws. In other words, science must point out natural classes.
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9. EXAMPLES OF N ATU RAL CLASSES
We have seen that a natural classification is one that proceeds 
according to the purpose or quasi-purpose of the existence of the 
‘objects’ classified. But what does the word ‘object’ depict in the 
above given description? Are the objects properties, processes, states, 
facts, events, or things? To answer this question, it seems advisable 
first to consider the examples Peirce gave of natural classes. We begin 
with the more obvious examples given in human experience.
9.1 Examples from  the Realm o f Human Experience: •
Social Classes, the Sciences, and Artificial Objects
The examples taken from the realm of human experience are usually 
easiest to classify, for in this domain it is often easy to discover by what 
purpose the objects of a class are determined. Social classes are examples 
of natural classes. Peirce mentions artists, practical men (business men), 
and scientists (CP  1.43; c. 1896). Each of these groups owes its identity 
to a specific purpose. One might extend the list to include Christians, 
Mathematicians, Jews, Muslims and Pagans. While Mill listed these as 
artificial classes, they are excellent illustrations of Peircean natural classes. 
On the other hand, Peirce would probably agree with Mill that ‘English­
men’ constitute an artificial social class; for there is no specific identity or 
goal that is common and specific to the English.
The sciences provide a second category of examples of Peircean 
natural classes that are closely related to the realm of human action. 
Indeed, Peirce developed most of his ideas about natural classes while 
working out a classification scheme of the sciences. All science is di­
vided into three major branches, each of which has a different pur­
pose: Practical Science, Science of Review, and Science of Discovery 
or Research. Whereas Practical Science deals with investigations con­
ducted for utilitarian purposes, the Science of Review aims at system­
atizing available knowledge. Science of Research is not defined in 
terms of available knowledge, but in terms of the concrete life of 
those whose “single animating purpose” it is to find out the truth for 
its own sake ( C P 7.54; c.1902). Within each branch, every science is 
classified according to its specific purpose or object. The classifica­
tions are hierarchical; the more general the object, the higher is its 
place in the hierarchy.23
The artificial objects art the third category of examples from the 
domain of human culture. A natural classification of artificial objects 
is a classification according to the purpose for which they were made. 
Accordingly, it can be said that stoves are different from lamps be­
cause they serve a different aim. Often artificial objects may also be 
classified according to subsidiary purposes. Thus, bicycles may easily 
be classified into city bikes, mountain bikes, racing bikes, tracking 
bikes, etc., each according to its specific purpose. If we classify bi­
cycles according to their purpose, the classification is natural; a classi­
fication according to color would be artificial.
To illustrate the precedence of form over matter in natural classi­
fications, Peirce also gave an example from the domain of art: "... 
who would classify Rafael’s paintings according to their predominant 
tinges instead of according to the nature of the composition, or the 
stages of Rafael’s development?” (NEM} IV, 322; c.1906) Only the 
form or structure of the compositions “renders the composition of 
the entire classified object rationally intelligible,” not their matter. 
Apparently, knowledge of this structure provides insight into the 
purposes o f the painter.
Furthermore, there is an important similarity between classifica­
tions of works of art and classifications of chemical substances and 
biological classes; in all of these the final cause is displayed in some 
kind of structure.
9.2 The Chemical Elements
According to Peirce, the chemical elements differ in an impor­
tant respect from all other natural classes: they are grouped not hier­
archically, but periodically. Peirce insisted that when forms have de­
veloped from other forms, their genetic classification must be hierar­
chical. However, Mendeleef’s classification of the chemical elements 
is definitely not hierarchical. “It is a cross classification o f an exact 
mathematical type” (MS 421, 1893-5; italics mine). According to 
Peirce, this strongly indicates that, contrary to biological forms, the
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chemical elements have not originated by a development of one from 
the other.24 Indeed, it was Peirce’s view that there are two different 
kinds o f  systematic relationships between different natural kinds. 
Whereas classes are normally grouped according to the Aristotelian 
hierarchical model, chemistry groups the elements periodically.
Dmitri Mendeleef had been the first person to arrange the ele­
ments according to their periodic similarities (1869). He found that 
if the elements are arranged approximately according to their increas­
ing atomic weight, elements with similar physical and chemical prop­
erties occur at periodic intervals. His table proved to be a good guide 
to predicting chemical behavior, because it enabled us to determine 
what elements should be chemically similar to others. Not only do 
similar elements act alike, but their compounds may also act alike. 
For instance, NaCl has properties which are similar to those of both 
KC1 and RbCl, because Na, K, and Rb are chemically alike.
Peirce, however, thought that the chemical elements owe their 
classification first and foremost to their valency. Indeed, natural clas­
sification is classification according to structure. But indecomposible 
chemical elements have no parts, and therefore no internal structure. 
Thus only their external structure must be taken into account. The 
external structure o f  an element was defined by Peirce as “the struc­
ture o f  its possible compounds” (CP  1.289; c.1908). In chemical 
elements, the basis o f all external structure is valency:
In classification generally, it may fairly be said to be estab­
lished, if it ever was doubted, that Form, in the sense of struc­
ture, is of far higher significance than Material. Valency is the 
basis of all external structure; and where indecomposability 
precludes internal structure [...] Valency ought to be made 
the first consideration. (M S 292, p.34; 1906)
The view that elements are indecomposible has been refuted by 20th 
century physics. But in a way, the idea that elements do have an inter­
nal structure which determines their valency and behavior, only con­
firms the consistency of Peirce’s view that (a) natural classification is
classification according to the final cause of the objects classified, and 
that (b) natural classification is classification according to structure. 
An external structure can hardly be a final cause of the objects classi­
fied, because it depends itself upon the existence of those objects. An 
attempt will be made to show that the internal structure can be such 
a final cause. First, however, it must be shown that internal structures 
can never be efficient causes.
That the internal structure cannot be an efficient cause appears 
from three facts: (a) whereas efficient causes are always concrete events 
or facts, internal structures are always general, for they are displayed in 
a multitude of events. Moreover, (b) because efficient causation is not 
directed toward an end in any way, it cannot explain that atomic struc­
tures are responsible for the atom’s tendency to behave in a regular way. 
Finally (c), whereas efficient causes only induce one or more lines of 
mechanical causation at one singular moment, the atomic structure 
continually induces events to conform to a definite pattern.25
Because Peirce recognized only two types of causation — effi­
cient causation and final causation — one is forced to conclude that 
inasmuch as the internal structure has some kind of causal influence,
»
it must necessarily be teleological causation. Indeed, the internal struc­
ture has all the characteristics of final causation: (a) it is general, (b) it 
explains a tendency to behave in a regular way, and (c) it continuously 
induces processes of causation to conform to a definite pattern.
Thus, there is no reason for believing that Peirce would not have 
agreed with the contemporary insights of physics, according to which the 
external structure (or valency) of the chemical elements is determined by 
their internal structure. Therefore, according to our (20th century) inter­
pretation of Peirce, it would be correct to say that the chemical elements 
are classified according to their internal or atomic structure.
Whereas the chemical elements are classified according to their 
atomic structure, the chemical compounds are classified according to 
their molecular structure. The classification of compounds is related 
to the fact that “ ... all samples of the same molecular structure react 
chemically in exactly the same way...” (C P 4.530; 1906). The m o­
lecular structure is represented by what chemists nowadays call the
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structural formula, which is to be distinguished from the molecular 
formula, which merely gives the numbers of the different atoms. This 
explains that compounds with the same molecular formula do not 
necessarily belong to the same natural class: “who would for one 
instant liken ordinary alcohol to methyl ether (which has the same 
material composition) instead o f with the alcoholates?” (NEM IV, 
321-22). Though ordinary alcohol and methyl ether have the same 
molecular formula (C 2 H 6 0 ), they still have a different structural 
formula (respectively: C H 3-C H 2-O H  and C H 3-0-C H 3). Ordinary 
alcohol does not belong to the same kind as methyl ether, because it 
has a different geometrical structure.
Similarly, analogous behavior of two compounds may indicate 
that the molecular structures are similar: “to take a simple example, 
chlorates KCI03, manganates KM n03, bromates KBr03, rutheniates 
K R u03, iodates K I03 , behave chemically in strikingly analogous 
ways” (CP1.223; 1902).26 Similarity of behavior indicates that there 
is a similarity o f molecular structure, and a certain degree of similarity 
o f molecular structure is a good reason for believing that we are deal-
_ _
ing with the same natural class.27
To summarize: the chemical elements and the chemical com­
pounds are classified, respectively, according to their atomic and their 
molecular structures. Because Peirce defined natural classifications as 
those that were made according to the final cause to which the mem­
bers of the class owe their existence, it may be concluded that he 
thought the final cause of the atom or the molecule to be expressed 
in their internal structure. Inasmuch as these structures are expressed 
in individual entities, they are neither universal nor particular. But 
qua structures, they are universal. According to Peirce, chemical struc­
tures are final causes, because (a) they general (znA. therefore pos­
sibilities, not actualities), and because (b) they explain the tendencies 
to behave according to definite patterns.
Next we will see that for biological species the defining cause 
is also a chemical structure.
9.3 The Biological Species
Peirce was a chemist by training, who from his youth onwards 
had shown a serious interest in the classification of the chemical ele­
ments. It may be assumed that his interest in the problem of natural 
classes arose within that context. This idea is confirmed by the fact 
that he devoted many more pages to the chemical elements than, for 
example, to the biological species. This may also explain why Peirce 
tried to apply his findings about chemical kinds to the biological kinds.
Thus he sought the metaphysical essence (final cause) of biologi­
cal species in their internal structure, which he identified with the 
chemical constitution of their protoplasm. He felt confident that fu­
ture research would show that the chemical constitution of the pro­
toplasm is “ the sole determining cause of the forms of all animals and 
plantsn (CP 1.262; italics mine). This leads us to believe that, if Peirce 
had known modern molecular biology, he would not have hesitated 
to consider the chemical structure of DNA as the metaphysical es­
sence of biological species. DNA is precisely that part of the proto­
plasm that determines the essential morphological and functional 
characters of the biological species. Moreover, DNA is related to he­
redity. Thus, the cause of heredity is the chemical structure of DNA. 
And thus heredity must be related to final causality:
Heredity [...] is not a force but a law, although, like other 
laws, it doubtless avails itself of forces. But it is essentially 
that the offspring shall have a general resemblance to the 
parent, not that this general resemblance happens to result 
from this or that blind and particular action. No doubt, there 
is some blind efficient causation, but it is not that which 
constitutes the heredity, but, on the contrary, the general 
resemblance. (CP 1.215; 1902)
Thus, whereas classification is always classification according to form, 
in biological species, the form is the expression of the internal struc­
ture of DNA. Because DNA is the final cause o f the biological class, it 
may also be said that classification in biological species is classification
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according to their final cause,
Peirce’s approach was broadly Aristotelian inasmuch as natural 
classification always concerns the form o f  things (which is that by vir­
tue o f which things are what they are) and not their matter. This entails 
that Peirce borrowed Aristotle’s idea that the form was identical to the 
intrinsic final cause. Therefore it was obvious that natural classification 
concerns the final causes of the things. From the natural sciences, Peirce 
had learned that the forms of chemical substances and biological spe­
cies are the expression o f a particular internal structure. He recognized 
that it was precisely this internal structure that was the final cause by 
virtue o f  which the members of the natural class exist.
To summarize: whereas natural classes are not defined in terms of 
essential qualities, but in terms of a fin a l cause (and therefore in terms 
o f possible behavior), the fina l cause may yet be expressed in some empiri­
cal internal structure. The chemical sub stances, the biological species, 
and a r t objects are Peirce’s main examples of such natural classes. In 
these cases} similarity o f internal structure indicates that objects belong 
to the same natural class.
1C). WAS PEIRCE A  PLU RALIST  
REG ARD IN G  N A T U R A L  CLASSES?
We started our investigation by giving a survey of the interpreta­
tions o f  Peircean natural kinds that were given by, respectively, Haack 
(1992), Iiookway (1985), and Rosenthal (1994). One of the most 
im portant questions raised by them, was: how pluralistic is Peirce’s 
conception o f natural class?
Before tackling this question, it may be helpful to distinguish 
three meanings o f  pluralism, two of which I borrow from John Dupré. 
Pluralism (1)} as opposed to reductionism or eliminativism, refers to 
“ the insistence on the equal reality and causal efficacy of objects both 
large and small” (Dupre, 1993, 7). This pluralism rejects in principle 
the reduction o f  macro-objects to subatomic particles. Eliminativism, 
in its most extreme form, would lead to the conclusion that there is 
only one natural class: the fundamental particles or processes ofphys- 
ics; microrcductionism wants us to believe that causes at our normal,
common sense level of awareness, are not real. I will call the pluralism 
which rejects eliminativism and microreductionism causal pluralism.
Pluralism (2), as opposed to classical essentialism, is “the claim 
that there are many equally legitimate ways of dividing the world into 
kinds.” Our classifications are partly determined by our interests or 
purposes, and partly by “ the recalcitrance of nature.’5 This pluralism 
rejects classical essentialism because it denies the idea that things pos­
sess essential properties (which are both necessary and sufficient for a 
thing to belong to a natural class), independently of any context of 
inquiry. But it maintains that our activity is constrained by events 
beyond our control. Questions like, To which natural kind does this 
object belong? are always relative to a context, that is to say, “such 
questions can be answered only in relation to some specification of 
the goal underlying the intent to classify the object” (Dupre, 1993, 
5-6). For this type let us borrow Dupre’s terms promiscuous realism 
or radical ontological pluralism (Dupre, 1993, 5-7,12,18).
However, ‘pluralism’ may also be the doctrine that we are entirely 
free to classify the world as we would like to. Accordingly, pluralism 
(3) may be defined as the claim that there are infinitely many equally 
legitimate ways o f dividing the world into kinds; our classifications are 
not restricted by any ‘recalcitrance of nature.” O f course, the use of the 
prefix ‘natural* to ‘class’ would become disputable, but the fact is that 
there are philosophers who speak of natural kinds in this way. I will call 
this type anarchistic pluralism. Whereas pluralism 1 is compatible with 
pluralism 2 and 3, pluralisms 2 and 3 are incompatible.
From our discussion in section 2, it appears that Haack considers 
Peirce to be a causal pluralist, Rosenthal sees him as a promiscuous 
radical ontological pluralist, while Hookway is bound to call him an 
anarchistic pluralist.
That Peirce was not a pluralist in the promiscuous sense (plural­
ism 2) and even less so in the anarchistic sense (pluralism 3), appears 
clearly from the following statement in which he explicitly denies the 
possibility of more than one system of natural classification: “there 
are artificial classifications in profusion, but [there is] only one natural 
classification” (CP 1 .275,1902; italics mine).
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From oar previous discussion it has appeared that natural classes 
are primarily determined by one and only one defining idea. This 
defining idea or D-character is the final cause to which the members 
owe their existence as members of the class. However, as a result of 
subsidiary purposes, there are different levels o f  natural classes: “there 
are several different categories of secondary and subordinate purpose. 
These categories of purpose must be categories of every system of 
natural classification” (MS 1343, p .16-17). Accordingly, “each class 
is distinguished by performing its part o f the general purpose of the 
branch [the more general class], or carrying out the general idea in a 
special way” (MS 1344, p.l 5). Thus, a racing car belongs to the natural 
class of racing cars, as well as to the (more general) natural class of 
cars, and also to the (even more general) natural class of vehicles. 
Though natural classes may partially overlap with each other, and 
each object probably belongs to more than one natural class, there is 
but one natural system of classification. In this sense Peirce was a 
monist, not a pluralist.
To further clarify Peirce’s view, it seems appropriate to consider 
Dupre’s illustration of radical ontological pluralism:
In relation to an account o f  the workings o f a car, it is quite 
straightforwardly true that a particular constituent object 
should be classified, for example, as a piston. This classifica­
tion correctly identifies the (sole) function o f this constitu­
ent in the overall economy of the larger system of the car.
But the unambiguousness of this identification is clearly rela­
tive to a particular context, the context defined by the over­
all function of the car. And it is quite possible for the career 
of the piston to exceed its tenure in the car and to continue 
as a hammer or a weapon. Since the world is not a machine, 
nature does not generally provide contexts that can serve to 
determine unambiguously the kinds to which objects belong, 
and such context must typically be provided instead by the
4
goals of a particular investigation. (Dupre, 1993, 5-6)
I think that Peirce would have argued, against Dupre, that context 
may only be relevant in a very restricted sense; it determines the (hier­
archical or periodical) level within our classification system at which we 
aim in our discussion. Thus context may determine that we rate a par­
ticular car to the natural class of racing cars instead o f to the more 
general natural class o f cars. But cars are cars, and pistons are pistons, 
even if they are used for different purposes. Remember that Peirce 
defined a natural class clearly as a class the members of which owe their 
existence to a common and peculiar final cause. Thus a piston is first 
and foremost a piston, independent of the way it is used. In this sense, 
Dupre’s view is perhaps more radically functionalistic than Peirce’s.
The idea that objects belong to unambiguously discoverable natu­
ral classes, is intimately connected with Peirce’s specific essentialism: 
what makes an object belong to a particular natural class is that it be 
ideologically caused by the D-character. The D-character unambigu­
ously determines to what natural class an object belongs, indepen­
dently o f any context of inquiry (in the sense that was meant by Dupre).
This interpretation is opposed to Rosenthal’s, according to which 
the concept o f a Peircean natural class is intimately related to a con­
text of inquiry. Though she does not doubt that it is Peirce’s view 
that within a certain commonly accepted context, investigation can 
“tend toward an ideal limit of convergence,” she insists that it was 
not Peirce’s view that there is also a convergence of contexts. There is 
not one ultimately correct context which clearly determines to what 
natural class an object belongs:
When a community is operating within a common system of 
meanings on any one issue, then investigation can tend to­
ward an ideal limit of convergence. However, when differ­
ent segments o f  interpreters experience different facts be­
cause o f different sets of meaning structures for cutting into 
the indefinitely rich continuity of possibilities of ordering, 
such convergence cannot occur. The criterion for adequately 
cutting is workability, but workability can be established only 
relative to some meaningful network by which experience is
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“caught*” Thus there may be a pluralism of interpretations 
among varying groups o f interpretations on any topic. For 
each group, identifiable by varying nets or perspectives for 
the catching o f experience, is variously structuring some con­
tours of a world. [...] [T]he essential pluralism is often hid­
den from view in the misplaced drive toward a common con­
clusion based on “the evidence.” (Rosenthal, 1994, 17)
Against Rosenthal I would argue that Peirce’s view that in the long run 
science will discover the final causes o f  things, entails that there is one 
ultimate context which is not determined by our purposes, but by the 
purposes (final causes) of the things themselves. Though there may be 
countless goals underlying our intent to classify, there is but one m tu- 
m l  classification. It is not our purpose (final cause) that is at stake, but 
the final cause of the natural class itself (see section 5). And in that 
sense, Peirce was not a ‘radical ontological pluralist.’ When he writes 
that “truly natural classes may, and often do, merge into one another 
inextricably” ( CP 1.209), he only meant to say that, though each ob­
ject definitely belongs to a natural class, there are no sharp demarca­
tion criteria by virtue o f which it can always be unambiguously decided 
to which o f two closely related classes an object belongs, Whenever 
closely related classes are not separated by sharp lines o f  demarcation, 
non-TDE (teleologically determined empirical) characters may help us 
in ascertaining to which of the two classes the object belongs: “unless 
we have some supplementary information we cannot tell which ones 
had one purpose and which the other” (CP 1,208). If  Peirce’s defini­
tion o f a natural class as “a class o f which all the members owe their 
existence to a common final cause” (C P  1.204) is taken seriously, one 
cannot but conclude that even the members o f  apparently fuzzy classes 
belong to specific natural classes, regardless o f  the difficulty we experi­
ence in our attempt at classification.
If natural classes arc not even partly determined by our interests 
and conventions, then Hookway*s position that “ [generality is real, 
but dividing things into classes reflects our interests and conventional 
decisions” must also be rejected (Hookway, 1985, 251), Hookway
concurs with Peirce when he writes that natural classes are real, but he 
fails to see the implication for natural classes. Natural classes are real, 
because they are generals. Though dividing things into classes may 
reflect our interests, natural classes do not. Hookway’s interpretation 
may be due to his mistakenly conceiving natural classes as concrete, 
existing things. But such conception is the result of a category mistake.
But, whereas Peirce was neither a ‘radical ontological pluralist5 
nor an ‘anarchistic pluralist,5 he most certainly defended a causal p lu­
ralism. There are many different levels of natural classes (physical 
entities, chemical entities, biological entities, sociological entities, 
artifacts, etc.), and therefore also many different levels o f  causation. 
Each class is characterized by a distinctive fina l cause, and the objects 
belonging to a natural class do so by virtue of their ability to exert a type 
of real causal influence. Thus, it is the task of science to determine 
exactly what natural classes there are.
The idea that Peirce was a causal pluralist agrees with Haack’s 
interpretation of Peircean natural kinds. As we have seen, Haack cor­
rectly pointed out that Peircean natural kinds are “the kinds of things 
in the world that really do behave in a lawlike way.55 2 8 If so, examples 
of natural classes are horses, men, and stones,29 which are all macro­
scopic objects. She therefore clearly acknowledged that Peirce thor­
oughly rejected any kind of microreductionism. Not only the funda­
mental processes o f physics can have a real causal influence, but so 
can men, horses, and all kind o f other macro-objects.
But Haack’s paper was not intended to give a detailed account of 
Peircean natural classes (neither were the relevant parts in Rosenthal’s 
and Hookway5s books). Hence we should not be surprised that her 
picture is in some ways incomplete. For instance, she fails to provide 
a precise enough definition and precise demarcation criteria which 
might help us to distinguish natural classes from artificial ones. More­
over, by not considering Peirce’s theory of natural classes within the 
context of his theory of final causation, she was not able to explain 
why the world of physics is not more real than our common sense 
world, or why there is no ontological conflict between the objects of 
scientific inquiry and the objects of other endeavors. Scientific ob-
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jects belong to natural classes, but so do artificial objects, because in 
both cases the existence of these objects is determined by a final cause 
which is common and specific to the members of the class. Finally, 
she also fails to give a clear insight into the problem of the relation­
ship between natural classes and causation.
12. CONCLUSION: NATURAL CLASSES AND CAUSATION.
The problem of natural kinds is important because it is inextrica­
bly linked to several philosophical notions, such as induction, univer- 
sals, scientific realism, explanation, causation, and natural law. The 
main concern of this paper has been the relationship between natural 
classes, causation and natural laws. Natural classes are often seen as 
the kinds of things that behave in a lawlike way; objects belonging to 
the same natural class are considered to play the same causal role in 
nature. This somehow involves the notion that lawful causal relations 
presuppose that there are natural classes.
In this paper, it was established that Peirce’s mature discussion of 
natural classes was intimately related to his theory of causation. Ac­
cording to this theory, while each event is part of a continuous chain 
of events, each chain of events is characterized by some kind of ten­
dency. Thus, each act of causation has an efficient and a final compo­
nent. The efficient aspect of causation is that each event is caused by 
a previous event (the efficient cause); the teleological aspect is that 
each event is part of a causal chain with a definite tendency. Although 
this is an original and provocative theory, Peirce unfortunately still 
clung to the expression ‘final cause.’ This expression is misleading, 
because what Peirce meant by a ‘final cause’ was altogether different 
from what we nowadays call ‘a cause.’
Peirce’s originality in respect of natural classes concerns at least 
two insights: first, he made clear that all classification, be it natural or 
artificial, must be related to some purpose. Secondly, natural classifi­
cations do not primarily involve our purposes, but the final causes of 
the classified things themselves.
Accordingly, Peirce’s view may be summarized as follows: Things 
belong to the same natural class on account of a metaphysical essence
and a number of class characters. The metaphysical essence is a gen­
eral principle by virtue of which the members of the class have a 
tendency to behave in a specific way; this is what Peirce meant by 
final cause. This finality may be expressed in some sort of microstruc­
ture. The class characters which by themselves are neither necessary 
nor sufficient conditions for membership of a class, are nevertheless 
concomitant. In the case of a chair, the metaphysical essence is the 
purpose for which chairs are made, while its having chair-legs is a 
class character. The fuzziness of boundary lines between natural classes 
is due to the fuzziness of the class characters. Natural classes, though 
very real, are not existing entities; their reality is of the nature of 
possibility, not of actuality. The primary instances of natural classes 
are the objects of scientific taxonomy, such as elementary particles in 
physics, gold in chemistry, and species in biology, but also artificial 
objects and social classes.
In respect of the contemporary discussion, Peirce’s view involves a 
rejection of microreductionism and eliminativism as viable theories of 
natural classes; Peirce’s theory, which we have labelled a causal plural­
ism (because it insists on the equal reality and causal efficacy of both
*
micro- and macro-objects), does not reduce our common sense, daily 
experience in favor of some abstract, physical principles. Though the 
scientific method may yield knowledge of natural classes, there are many 
obvious examples that are derived from common, human experience.
By denying that final causes are static, unchangeable entities, 
Peirce avoided the problems attached to classical essentialism. On 
the other hand, by eliminating arbitrariness, Peirce also avoided plu­
ralistic anarchism. Though Peircean natural classes only come into 
being as a result of the abstractive an4d selective activities of the people 
who classify, they reflect objectively real general principles. Thus, there 
is not the slightest sense in which they are arbitrary: “there are artifi­
cial classifications in profusion, but [there is] only one natural classi­
fication” (CP 1.275; 1902).
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NOTES
1. The investigations for this article were supported by the Foun­
dation for Research in the Field of Philosophy and Theology which is subsi­
dized by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). I thank 
Guy Debrock, Jaap van Brakel and Peter Kroes for their critical comments on 
earlier drafts, and William Hornix for some useful comments on the section on 
chemical substances. I thank Nathan Houser and Andre De Tienne (Peirce 
Edition Project, Indianapolis), and Kenneth Ketner (Institute for Studies in 
Pragmaticism, Lubbock) for helping me in collecting the relevant manuscripts.
2> All references of the type MS xx refer to Peirce’s manuscripts
as listed in Richard Robin’s Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. 
Pcirce> Amherst, 1967. References of the type CPx.xx refer to the volume and 
paragraph number of the Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, 8 vols., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge Mass., Vol. 1-6,1931-5, edited by Ch. Hartshorne 
and P. Weiss; Vol. 7-8 edited by A. Burks, 1958. References of the type NEM 
x,yy refer to volume and page numbers of Jhe New Elements of Mathematics by 
Charles S. Peirce, edited by C. Eisele, 4 volumes in 5 books, The Hague, Mou- 
ton, 1976. References of the type EP I, xx refer to the page number of the first 
volume of The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings (1867-189 3), eds. 
N. Houser and C. Kloesel, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992.
3. Hacking, 1991.
4. Only this can explain that Haack, in an otherwise brilliant pa­
per on Peirce’s “Scholastic Realism,” could write about the relationship be­
tween natural classes and final causation: “I am unable to judge whether Peirce’s 
suggested characterization could be made acceptable” (Haack, 1992, 50, note 
45), Similarly, Beverly Kent, in her extensive book on Peirce’s “Logic and the 
Classification of the Sciences,” ignores the importance of final causation in con­
junction with natural classifications because “Peirce was often obscure, if not 
actually mystical, in some of his writings on final causation within the context of 
natural classification” (Kent, 1987,229, note 1 1). A notable exception of some­
one who does recognize the importance of final causation for natural classifica­
tions is Helmut Pape (1989, 1993). Pape’s discussion, however, concerns pri­
marily Peirce’s idea of a natural classification of the sciences, rather than his idea
of natural classes.
5. Hulswit, 1996.
6 . In Kripke’s own words: “Given that gold does have the atomic 
number 79, could something be gold without having the atomic number 79? 
... consider a possible world ... in which, let us say, fool’s gold or iron pyrites 
was actually found in the areas which actually contain gold now . Would we 
say ... that in that situation gold would not even have been an element (because 
pyrites is not an element)? ... One should not say that [this substance] would 
still be gold in this possible world though gold would then lack the atomic 
number 79. It would be some other stuff. ... It [is] necessary and not contin­
gent that gold be an element with atomic number 79” (Kripke, 1980, 123).
7. Van Brakel, 1992,243-4.
8 . Successively: Haack, 1993a, 134; Haack 1992, 29 and 
Haack 1992, 25.
9. See Hacking, 1991, 118.
10. Note that, for the young Peirce, the rejection of strict unifor­
mities does not entail the rejection of determinism. It was only from 1880 on 
that Peirce sets out to challenge determinism.
11. For example in Peirce’s earliest text about natural kinds, which 
we have discussed in section 3.2 (W 1,416; 1866); also in his MS42\ \ c. 1893-5.
12. Peirce would not make the distinction between kind and 
class until 1908.
13. “An important character is obviously one upon which others 
depend, that is, one the inclusion of which in a definition renders true general 
propositions concerning the object defined possible; and the more such propo­
sitions a character renders possible, the more important it is” (W 2 ,443 ; 1867).
14. References to manuscripts that begin with 00 are from Ken­
neth Ketner’s IP (Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism) numbering system.
15. The insight that Peirce borrowed his idea that generals are 
possibles from Duns Scotus, I owe to Mauer (1983, 8).
16. I avoid the expression ‘PRE-character’ simply because Peirce no 
longer refers to them beyond the year 1902. This will be further explained in section 5.
17. For Peirce’s Century Dictionary Definition of ‘essence,’ see 
the appendix to this paper (or WS, 417; 1886).
18. In 1902 Peirce applied for a grant from the Carnegie Apllication 
to complete and publish his studies in philosophy. His request was not honored.
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19. For an explanation of Peirce’s conception of teleology, see Hulswit, 
1996. For an explanation of his “developmental teleology,” see 195-8.
20. The same observation has been made by Hilary Putnam: “it 
sounds strange to be told that a human being is not identical with the aggrega­
tion of the molecules in his body. Yet on a moment’s reflection each of us is 
aware that he was not that aggregate of molecules a day ago. Seven years ago, 
precious few of those molecules were in my body. If  after my death that exact 
set of molecules is assembled and placed in a chemical flask, it will be the same 
aggregation of molecules, but it won’t be me” (Putnam, 1995, 235).
21. For this evoLution from Peirce’s early nominalist sympathies 
toward his mature commitment to scholastic realism, see Fisch, 1986.
2 2 . Though Peirce does not speak of essential qualities in his 1866 
paper, he does speak about “properties which are implied” in the definition of 
the natural class ( W 1 , 418).
23. For explanations of Peirce’s Natural Classifications of the Sci­
ences , see Kent (1987) and Pape (1989, 1993). Pape explicitly deals with the 
relationship between final causation and natural classifications.
24. Peirce has a second argument for his idea that chemical ele­
ments were not subject to evolution: “The irregularities of biological classifica­
tion are the traces of the geological vicissitudes through which the earth’s sur­
face has passed. There is no trace of anything analogous to this in the chemical 
classification” (MS 421).
25. For a detailed account of the differences between efficient and 
final causation, see Hulswit, 1996, esp. 188-191.
26. Manganates are in fact K2Mn04, and rutheniates K2Ru04.
27. The question regarding the criteria of ‘sufficient similarity’ is 
empirical in nature; it has to be answered by chemistry. In contemporary chem­
istry, analogous behavior points to analogous molecular structure even when 
there is no similarity in molecular formulas. In those cases, the chemist will try 
to rewrite the formulas in an analogous form. For example, the molecular for­
mulas C H 40  (methanol) and C2H60 (ethanol) are rewritten as the structure 
formulas C H 30H  and C2H50H .
28. This also agrees with Hacking’s interpretation. According to 
Hacking, that which makes something a Peirce-kind is “its role in a Systematic 
interconnected web of laws of nature” (Hacking, 1990, 120-21). Hacking’s
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formulation contains both a mistake and an important insight. His description 
is misleading inasmuch as his expression “laws of nature” suggests that Peirce’s 
notion of law is restricted to what we nowadays consider to be the (fundamen­
tal) laws of nature. Haack’s reference to habitlike behavior is much more appro­
priate, However, Hacking’s description contains an important insight which is 
lacking in Haack’s description. A Peirce-kind is not only characterized by the 
sum of its habits, but also, and even more so, by a systematic connection of
*
habits. This is provided by the final cause to which the members of the class 
owe their existence.
29. There are no final causes or laws that are specific to stones. 
The law of gravity is a final cause which makes all things of a certain density 
approach the centre of the earth, not just stones. Peirce’s Harvard experiment 
was not so much about what natural kinds there are; its purpose was only to 
prove that there are “general principles operating in nature.’*
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